Wireless sensor network has many small sensor nodes that work in collaborative manner to achieve a specific task. But it is deployed in unattended environment and that is why it is prone to attacks. These attacks mainly fall into two categories that is application dependent and application independent .In this paper the focus is on the node replication attack which falls under application independent attacks. In this paper a survey has been done related to node replication attack and existing techniques for solving this issue has been studied. The paper mainly focuses on the types of attacks on wireless sensor network and the two techniques centralized and distributed detection for detection of the node replication attack. Defending against this node replication attack is recently become a research topic in the security of wireless sensor network. The applications and advantages of centralized detection and distributed detection and their respective limitations has been studied.
Fig: Node replication attack detection schemes
There are two types of detection techniques that are described below:
II.
Centralized Detection Technique
Straightforward scheme:
It requires each node to send a list of its neighbours (more specifically, a list of their ids) and the positions claimed by these neighbours (and signed by them, e.g., with an id-based signature scheme) to the base station, which then examines every neighbour list to look for replicated sensor nodes. In a stationary WSN, conflicting position claims for one node id indicates a replication. In a stationary WSN, conflicting position claims for one node id indicates a replication. Once the base station spots one or more replicas, it can revoke the replicated nodes by flooding the network with an authenticated revocation message for broadcast authentication. While conceptually simple, this approach suffers from several drawbacks (Parno et al., 2005) inherent in a centralized system. First, the base station introduces a single point of failure and can become a significant bottleneck. Nodes close to the base station are known as hotspots will receive the huge routing load and thus there power supply get depleted .Thus network connectivity get depleted. Beside this base station hotspots are also target for attacks.
Set Operations:
This is a centralized detection scheme known as SET. This technique attempts to reduce the overhead by computing set operations such as Union, Intersection of exclusive subsets in the network. SET partitions the network logically in to non-overlapping regions called clusters. These clusters are managed by leaders known as cluster heads. These leaders report all the ids of the nodes in the region in the form of subset to base station. The intersection of an two subset of reports is empty that means no replication has occurred otherwise replication is detected. The actual set protocol is complex because of its complicated components. Which contribute to overload. SET protocol has to perform multiple rounds for countering the colluding replicas. One drawback is there for revoking an honest node an adversary can use SET protocol.
Detecting cloned keys:
It is used for addressing cloned cryptographic keys rather than cloned sensor nodes.
There is a random key distribution and key of a genuine nod should follow certain pattern. This helps for monitoring the key usage. Key usage refers to number of times key is used for setting the secure connection between neighbouring nodes. In this technique cloned keys are detected by analyzing node authentication statistics those keys whose usage exceeds a certain threshold (determined by the false positive rate) are considered cloned and erased from the network. Now each node will report its preloaded keys o base station. Now it is the task of base station to discover cloned keys. For collecting the key usage data bloom filter is used. Now this detection is effective when i) size of keys pre-distributed to each node is small, (ii) more clones exist in (i.e., are inserted into) the network, and (iii) a high false positive rate is set. Practically any WSN sensor node can communicate with only limited number of its neighbours within finite radius. This number is d known as average node degree or node density. The value of d can be adjusted by selecting appropriate transmission range. There is one drawback that e.g., how to ensure that the participating clones report their keys honestly (and exactly) to the base station. All the Centralized solution bear the deficiencies such as any compromise of base station will make the solution useless. For another example, even if there are no attacks, the nodes surrounding the base station (i.e., the hotspots) will suffer an undue communication burden that may shorten the life expectancy of the WSN. Because of this distributed solution become necessity.
III. Distributed Detection of Node Replication Attacks
In all four protocols, we assume that nodes know their own geographic positions. We also assume that the nodes in the network remain relatively stationary, at least for the time it takes to perform one round of replication detection. If the network designers anticipate occasional mobility, they can schedule regular detection rounds. As long as a node successfully participates in a round, it can continue to communicate until the next round, even if its position changes in the interim. Distributed detection of node replication attack can be done using following three techniques. These are: Node to network broadcasting witness based strategy with deployment knowledge.
2.1
Node-To-Network Broadcasting: N2NB where each node floods the entire network with authenticated broadcast to claim its own location(instead of its neighbours") .Each node stores the location information for its neighbours, incurring a storage cost of O(d). Each node upon receiving a conflicting claim invokes a revocation procedure against the offending nodes , and eventually any replica will be cut off by all its neighbours (thus isolated from the WSN). Each node stores the location information for its neighbors and if it receives a conflicting claim, revokes the offending node. This protocol achieves 100% detection of all duplicate location claims under the assumption that the broadcasts reach every node. This assumption may not hold if the adversary can jam key areas or otherwise interfere with communication paths through the network.The challenge for detecting replication attacks has roots in the resource scarcity of sensor nodes. For stationary WSNs , such detection essentially requires network-wide comparison of location-dependent authentication information, and the limited memory capacity and energy supply places ever constraints on how much authentication information can be stored per node and exchanged in the network (Zhang etal.,2009 ). Hence it is reasonable to trade the detection rate(e.g.,100%forN2NB)for other major performance criteria like energy efficiency and memory efficiency . Note that the wireless transceiver is the biggest energy consumer for sensor nodes, while the communication cost for N2NB is Oðn2Þ. 
Deterministic Multicast:
DM is based on claimer-reporter-witness framework. Main goal behind the design of DM is reduced communication cost and the main idea is to only send a node"s location claim to a limited set of deterministically chosen nodes serving as witnesses.For improving the communication cost of the N2NB protocol, we describe a detection protocol that only shares a node"s location claim with a limited subset of deterministically chosen "witness" nodes. When a node, referred to as the claimer, locally broadcasts its location claim to its neighbours, each neighbour, serving as a reporter, employs a function to map the claimer id to a witness. Then the neighbour forwards the claim to the witness, which will receive two different location claims for the same node id if the adversary has replicated anode. Now there is a immediate issue the adversary can also employ the function to know about the witness for a given claimer id, and may locate and compromise the witness node before she inserts the replicas into the WSN so as to evade the detection. To solve this problem DM employs n instances of a function so that one claimer id is mapped to n different witnesses. Nevertheless, each of the d neighbours does not necessarily need to forward the location claim to each of all g witnesses. If t is assumed that each reporter behaves independently. The well-studied coupon collector"s problem (Cormen etal.,2001 ) tells us that if the reporters randomly select in all g∑gi ¼ 1 1=i _ gðln gþ0:58Þ repeatable destinations from all g witnesses for the claimer, then More formally, in this protocol, whenever node γ hears a location claim lα from node α, it computes F(α) = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωg}, where F maps each node ID in the set of possible node IDs, S, to a set of g node IDs: F : S → {σ : σ ∈ 2 S , |σ| = g} (1) The nodes with IDs in the set {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωg} constitute the witnesses for node α. Node γ forwards lα to each of these witnesses. If α claims to be at more than one location, the witnesses will receive conflicting location claims, which they can flood through the network ,discrediting α. In this protocol, each node in the network stores g location claims on average. For communication, assuming α"s neighbors do not collaborate, we will need each of α"s neighbors to probabilistically decide which of the ωi to inform. If each node selects (g ln g) /d random destinations from the set of possible ωi, then the coupon collector"s problem [7] assures us that each of the ωi"s will receive at least one of the location claims. Assuming an average network path length of O(√n) nodes, this results in O( (g ln g√n)/d ) messages. Unfortunately, this cost does not provide much security. Since F is a deterministic function, an adversary can also determine the ωis. Thus, they become targets for subversion. If the adversary can capture or jam all g of the messages destined to the ωis, then she can create as many replicas of α as she desires (limited only by the requirement that no two replicas share a neighbor). Since the communication costs of this protocol grow as O(g ln g), we cannot afford a large value for g, and yet a small value for g allows the adversary almost unlimited replication abilities after compromising a fixed number of nodes; in other words, if the adversary controls the g witnesses for α, she can create unlimited replicas of α and suppress the conflicting reports arriving at the witness nodes. These disadvantages make this protocol unappealing.
Randomized multicast (RM):
RM also follows claimer-reporter-witness framework .But the witnesses become unpredictable for the adversary Therefore, both schemes can be regarded as improvements of the above DM. One major difference between RM and LSM lies in that in the former protocol the reporters randomly select several witnesses, while in the latter protocol nodes forwarding a location claim (i.e., on the path from a reporter to the corresponding witness) also save the claim for inspection, serving as additional witnesses.To improve the resiliency of the deterministic multicast protocol discussed in Section 4.2, we propose a new protocol that randomizes the witnesses for a given node"s location claim, so that the adversary cannot anticipate their identities. When a node announces its location, each of its neighbors sends a copy of the location claim to a set of randomly selected witness nodes. If the adversary replicates a node, then two sets of witnesses will be selected. In a network of n nodes, if each location produces √n witnesses, then the birthday paradox predicts at least one collision with high probability, i.e., at least one witness will receive a pair of conflicting location claims. The two conflicting locations claims form sufficient evidence to revoke the node, so the witness can flood the pair of locations claims through the network, and each node can independently confirm the revocation decision. At a high level, the protocol has each node broadcast its location claim, along with a signature authenticating the claim. Each of the node"s neighbors probabilistically forwards the claim to a randomly selected set of witness nodes. If any witness receives two different location claims for the same node ID, it can revoke the replicated node. The birthday paradox ensures that we detect replication with high probability using a relatively limited number of witnesses. More formally, each node α broadcasts a location claim to its neighbors, β1, β2, . . . , βd. The location claim has the format _IDα, lα, {H(IDα, lα)} where lα represents α"s location (e.g., geographic coordinates(x, y)). Upon hearing this announcement, each neighbor, βi, verifies α"s signature and the plausibility of lα (for example, if each node knows its own position and has some knowledge of the maximum propagation radius of the communication layer, then it can loosely bound α"s set of potential locations). Then, with probability p, each neighbor selects g random locations within the network and uses geographic routing (e.g.,GPSR [19] ) to forward α"s claim to the nodes closest to the chosen locations (as in GHT [30] ). Since we have assumed the nodes are distributed randomly, this should produce a random selection from the nodes in the network. In Section 5.3, we show that the probability of selecting the same node more than once is generally negligible. Collectively, the nodes chosen by the neighbors constitute the witnesses for α. Each witness that receives a location claim, first verifies the signature. Then, it checks the ID against all of the location claims it has received thus far. If it ever receives two different locations claims for the same node ID, then it has detected a node replication attack, and these two location claims serve as evidence to revoke the node. It blacklists α from further communication by immediately flooding the network with the pair of conflicting location claims, lα and l_α. Each node receiving this pair can independently verify the signatures and agree with the revocation decision. Thus, the sensor network both detects and defeats the node replication attack in a fully distributed manner. Furthermore, the randomization prevents the adversary from predicting which node will detect the replication.
Security Analysis Let malicious node α claim to be at L locations, l1,l2,. . . , lL. We would like to determine the probability of a collision using the randomized multicast protocol outlined above, since a collision at a witness corresponds to detection of α"s replication. At each location li, p · d nodes randomly select g witnesses. If the neighbors coordinated perfectly, this would store α"s location claim at exactly p · d · g locations. However, since we prefer to have each neighbor act independently, there may be some amount of overlap between the it nesses each neighbor selects. To determine the impact of this overlap, Nreceive, that will receive the location claim assuming the neighbors choose witnesses independently. If Pclaimis the probability that a node hears at least one claim and Pnone is the probability that a node hears no location claims, then we have: E[N receive ] = n · P claim (2) P claim = 1− P none (3) Since each neighbor is assumed to select g random, unique witness locations, the probability (Pf) that a
Since each neighbor decides independently whether to send out location claims, the number of nodes that actually send out location claims is distributed binomially, with mean p · d and variance d · p(1 −p). For a network with d = 20 and p = 1 10 , the variance will be less than0.005, so we will approximate the number of neighbors that send out locations claims as p · d. Since the neighbors choose their destinations independently, we have:
Combining equations 2, 3 and 5, the number of witness nodes that receive at least one location claim is:
The Binomial Theorem allows us to approximate (1 − x)y as (1 − xy) for small x, so as long as g _ n,we have Nreceive ≈ p·d·g, so overlapping witness locations should not impact the security of the protocol. As an example, in a network with n = 10, 000, g = 100,d = 20, and p = 0.1, perfect coordination would tell200 nodes, while independent selection would tell 199.Thus, for the remainder of the analysis, we will assume that p · d · g nodes receive each location claim. If the adversary inserts L replicas of α, we would like to determine the probability that two conflicting location reports collide at some witness node, since this corresponds to the probability that a witness detects the node replication. Note that even if there are more than two replicas of α, we still only need two location claims to collide in order to completely revoke all L of the replicas, since one collision will prompt a network-wide lood of the duplicate claims (li and lj ) and any other node that has heard location claim lk for k = i, j will also revoke α. Following the standard derivation of the birthday paradox [7] , the probability Pnc1 that the p · d · g recipients of claim l1 do not receive any of the p · d · g copies of claim l2 are given by:
Similarly, the probability Pnc2 that the 2·p·d·g recipients of claims l1 and l2 do not receive any of the p·d·g copies of claim l3 is given by:
P nc = ( ) Thus, the probability Pnc of no collisions at all is given by:
Using the standard approximation that (1+x) ≤ e x , we have:
≤ (12) Unlike the deterministic proposal (Section 4.2), we no longer need to worry about the adversary using a limited number of captured nodes to enable an unlimited amount of replication. If the adversary captures neighboring nodes α and β, then the total number of claims about either node is reduced by 1d , essentially reducing the neighbor count of each node by one. Since all of the protocol decisions are made locally by individual nodes, the adversary has only two options remaining: it can disrupt the routing of packets from the remaining legitimate neighbors or it can capture all of the legitimate neighbors. Routing disruptions create tell-tale signs of the adversary"s presence in the network and will be avoided by a prudent adversary
Line-Selected Multicast
If we interpret RM as a randomized version of DM, LSM can then be regarded as a less expensive version of RM to decrease the communication cost. On a high level, when node a"s location claim propagates from a reporter to a witness, all the intermediate nodes on the forwarding path also learn about the information, and can serve as additional witnesses, as shown in Fig. 2 . Hence whenever a conflicting location claim by a replica a0 crosses the forwarding path for a, the intermediate node at the intersection of the two path scan detect the conflict, i.e., an intersection corresponds to a detection of the replication attack. This idea can be compared to the following geometric theorem: for x randomly drawn lines within a circle, the expected number of intersections is about 0:339xðx_1Þ, and thus we only need a few such lines to insure an intersection(e.g. ,with only x¼3 random lines weexpect2collisions). Each location claim from a node a is forwarded to r random nodes following the claimer-reporter-witness framework, but the intermediate nodes on the r forward-ing paths also save a copy of the claim. Once another location claim is received by a witness(either selected by a reporter, or more likely, an additional one), it floods the network with the unforgivable evidence to exclude both a and a0 . One may notice that LSM actually ""draws"" r line segments (paths) that originate from reporters around a central point(the claimer node) and radiate out in random directions(to r random witnesses), instead of random lines (as in the aforementioned geometric theorem).However, even so, simulations indicate that even if there is only one replica(i.e., r random paths radiate from a, another r paths from a0), setting r¼2 assures that the probability for generating at least one intersection (i.e., the detection rate Pd) is above 56%, and r¼ 5 leads to 95%.Similar reliability holds for realistic WSN deployment fields with irregular topologies far different froma circular domain. Compared with RM, LSM has the network communication costs scaling as (O(√ ·n· r) and an average node storage cost of (1/n) ·r√ ·n location claims scaling as ( O √ ) .
Single deterministic cell (SDC) and parallel multiple probabilistic cells (P-MPC)
Zhu etal. (2007) proposed two schemes SDC and P-MPC under the brand ""localized multicast"". Essentially both are variants of DM (Section 4.2), and can be parsed as network-wide deterministic multicast, followed by in cell broadcast and probabilistic storage. In both schemes, the WSN deployment field is considered as a geographic grid of cells, and a location claim from node a is sent by its reporters to g¼1 (SDC)or g41 (P-MPC)cells for in-cell broadcast, the cell id(s)of which is/are deterministically mapped from ID a; each node in the destination cell(s) then probabilistically chooses to be a witness by saving the claim. If there is a replica a0 , its location claim is sent to the same cell(s) for in-cell broadcast, and thus the witnesses can spot the conflict. One may remark that the concept ""localized multicast"" advocated in Zhu etal. (2007) is not very exact. Both schemes also bear a similar dilemma with DM(Section 4.2) that if the cell size s is too large,theyincurexpensivecommunicationcostlikeN2NB (Section 4.1); if s is too small, they degenerate back to DM, and an adversary can defeat both schemes by compromising all nodes in the g deterministic ""tiny"" cells. Note that in the latter case(a very small s), all prospective witnesses in one cell are deployed close to each other with in a geographically limited region instead of sparsely spreading throughout the deployment field, and thus it is easy for an adversary to physically approach and compromise them once for all. Therefore, the practicality of SDC and P-MPC relies on careful selection of s. Unfortunately, in Zhu etal.(2007) the critical issue of choosing an appropriate cell size s is over-looked; for all provided examples, s is setto100nodeswithout any explanation/discussion. In practice, one needs to choose s carefully to find an appropriate trade off between efficiency and security. Another problem omitted in Zhu etal. (2007) is what weterm the indistinguishable dilemma. Take SDC for example. Once a location claim by node a arrives at the destination cell, it should be flooded within the cell so that each node in the cell independently stores the claim(i.e., becomes a witness)with probability ps. To reduce the in-cell broadcast to overhead, SDC requires that the
Randomized, efficient, and distributed (RED) detection
Conti etal. (2007) proposed a randomized, efficient, and distributed (RED)protocol, which combines both merits of DM (Section 4.2) and RM(Section 4.3.1). The major motivations from the fair nessor so called ""quality"" of the detection protocol (Conti etal., 2006) : resilience to attack scan be improved by designs that associate individual sensor nodes with equal risk level. For example, a protocol where the likelihood for a genuine node to serve as a witness node (known as the ""node appeal"") is independent of the node"s geographical position is more favourable, because such an ""area-oblivious"" protocol actually associates sensor nodes with almost even responsibility. In RED, each of the d neighbours of a claimer a becomes a reporter with probability p, and each reporter sends a"s location claim to a set of g pseudo-randomly selected network locations (hence to g witnesses, like RM).The point is that these pseudo-random locations are computed from ID a with a1-to-g deterministic mapping(like DM), which is seeded with a non received from centralized broadcasting(e.g., from a satellite).Once the random seed is shared network-wide at the beginning of each protocol iteration, the g witnesses are actually deterministic, and the witness set selected by any reporter for a is actually the same. Compared with RM and LSM (Section 4.3), RED" s philosophy lies in ""just enough witnesses"", which is inherited from DM. The product dpg can be merely very small constant (5 ffiffiffi n p ); it is even enough to set g¼1. Clearly, then ode storage is dpg location claims.. Importantly, the incurred overhead almost evenly balanced among sensor nodes. The probability that a claimer has no reporter is (1- ) it is also noted that the infrastructure for distributing RED"s random seed may not always be available. Moreover, since for each protocol iteration the witnesses set for any node is deterministic, there might exist a dilemma in selecting an appropriate g so as to balance between efficiency against node compromise (Zhu et al., 2010). ,2005) , and is the basis of all other three schemes. It reduces the number of stored location claims per node by factor ffiffiffi n p through the use of two compact Bloom filters, which are maintained by semi witnesses (known as watchers) and are reset right before each detection round. However, additional memory consumption per node has to be incurred for storing the two filters(essentially ""compressed"" location claims),and the overall node storage still scales as Oð ffiffiffi n p Þ (i.e., of the same level with LSM).Moreover, simulations show that B-MEM may lower the detection rate of LSM due to so called false verifications (Zhang etal.,2009 ) (essentially the intrinsic false positives of Bloom filters).The second, BC-MEM, employs a technique called cell forwarding to solve the cross over problem that unlike geometric line segments intersecting at a common point, in LSM even when two forwarding paths cross they may not intersect at a common node. One can indeed verify the problem by reconsidering the geographic routing(Section 2.2). The third, C-MEM, employs a technique called cross forwarding to address the aforementioned crowded center problem(Section 4.5) that in LSM random forwarding paths end to pass the central area of the deployment field more frequently, where the nodes suffer far worse over heads. For each claimer, C-MEM first select sa random point called the cross point in the network, and forwards the location claim to that point. From there, the claim is then forwarded in four directions, along the horizontal and vertical lines that pass the cross point. Last, CC-MEM integrates cell forwarding and cross forwarding, and thus is a combination of BC-MEM and C-MEM. Simulation results show that the performance of C-MEM is comparable to BC-MEM, because two set so crossing lines have a very high probability to intersect at one or two locations. That is, C-MEM can also mitigate the crossover problem. However, cross forwarding achieves a high probability for intersection only for a convex deployment field, particularly a rectangle (the simulations in Zhang etal.,2009 actually employed a square).For the various irregular topologies considered by LSM such as ""thin cross"", ""large H"",etc. (Parno etal.,2005) , the cross forwarding technique employed by both C-MEM and CC-MEM may work far poorer than in a rectangle; the detection rate may drop drastically. As to cell forwarding in BC-MEM, the basic idea is to divide the deployment field into virtual cells (like SDC and P-MPC Zhu etal., 2007). By employing a pseudo-random mapping similar to RED (Conti etal.,2007) but seeded with the detection round number W.T. Zhuetal./JournalofNetworkandComputerApplications35(2012)1022-1034 1030 in each cell an anchor node is assigned for each claimer in the network; one anchor node as a representative of the cell may ""serve"" different network-wide nodes. To solve the cross over problem, BC-MEM only chooses witnesses from these anchor nodes, which serve as definite intersections for forwarding paths. The price is increased energy expenditure, as any location claim is no longer forwarded along an approximately straight path but a zigzag path. A major problem with BC-MEM is that similar to Ho et al. (2009b) , the cell division and anchor node selection ask for highly accurate localization, which may not be affordable for the current generation of WSNs. A less serious problem is that an adversary may circumvent BC-MEM by compromising certain deterministic anchor nodes, assuming the detection only runs for a few rounds. An unaddressed problem is the policy for cell size selection (as also observed in SDC and P-MPC Zhu et al., 2007, recall Section 4.4), which makes fair comparison with other schemes difficult. In all simulations the deployment field is always divided into 100 cells without further explanation/discussion.
Memory

Randomly directed exploration (RDE)
In Li and Gong(2009a), a simplified version of N2NB(Section 4.1) known as randomly directed exploration(RDE)is proposed, where a location claim along with the claimer"s neighbour list is forwarded in such a manner that the each of the forwarding paths are approximately a straight line segment. We notice such a ""directed"" (i.e., oriented) forwarding approach is just a special (yet simple) implementation of geographic routing(Section 2.2) that only works for a convex deployment field(them or regular the better).There al interesting part lies in its motivation: RDE tries to mimic N2NB while suppressing broadcast flood. The underlying idea can be interpreted as follows: if the WSN is small-scale but very densely deployed, a ""thin"" forwarding path can become a ""thick belt"" to cover sufficient over hearing nodes. Hence it is plausible to substitute such an ""any cast"" (as suggested in Li andGong,2009a) for broadcast. RDE"s node storage cost remains the same with N2NB (i.e., O(d)), while the network communication overhead is reduced from O(n 2 ) to O(d· n√ )at the price of decreased detection rate. Note that we add the coefficient d to count for the cost of additionally forwarding claimer"s neighbour list(whichisnotforwardedinN2NB),whereas this cost is overlooked in the evaluation in Li and Gong(2009a). Actually, the communication reduction from O(n 2 ) to O(d· n√ )is not very beneficial. Moreover, RDE only seems feasible for an ideal network model, and the detection rate may not be very significant even for a convex deployment field.
2.3
With deployment knowledge scheme can be done using two techniqus.These are as follows: 1.Fingerprint with neighborhood: the best of our knowledge, the only approach that achieves real-time detection of clone attacks in WSN was proposed by Xing et al. [7] . In their approach, each sensor computes a fingerprint by incorporating the neighborhood information through a superimposed s-disjunctive code [16] . Each node stores the fingerprint of all neighbors. Whenever a node sends a message, the fingerprint should be included in the message and thus neighbors can verify the fingerprint. The messages sent by clone nodes deployed in other locations will be detected and dropped since the fingerprint does not belong to the same "community".
2.Group deployment
